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The Critical Metamorphoses of Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein 
 
WILLIAM CHRISTIE 
 
You must excuse a trifling deviation, 
From Mrs. Shelley’s marvellous 
narration 
 
—  from the musical Frankenstein; or, 
The Vampire’s Victim (1849) 
 
 
 Like Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner, who erupts into Mary Shelley’s 
text as occasionally and inevitably as the Monster into Victor 
Frankenstein’s life, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus passes, like 
night, from land to land and with stangely adaptable powers of speech 
addresses itself to a critical audience that is larger and more diverse than 
that of almost any other work of literature in English:  
 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is famously reinterpretable. It can be a 
late version of the Faust myth, or an early version of the modern myth 
of the mad scientist; the id on the rampage, the proletariat running 
amok, or what happens when a man tries to have a baby without a 
woman. Mary Shelley invites speculation, and in the last generation 
has been rewarded with a great deal of it.1 
 
How far we wedding guests have attended to what Frankenstein has to say 
and how far simply and unashamedly bound it to our own purposes is a 
moot point. Still, the fact that it can be — has been — read to mean so 
many things in its comparatively short life is what makes the novel 
especially fascinating and challenging. And I am concerned in this article 
only with the extent and variety of the academic critical attention 
Frankenstein has received; only with what we might call its ‘critical 
metamorphoses’. If we were to add to these critical metamorphoses all 
adaptations of the novel or myth in fiction, on stage, in the cinema and in 
retail, then the number of metamorphoses or different versions is quite 
literally incomprehensible: impossible to get around, to encircle and take 
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in. Mary Shelley’s older contemporary, the literary satirist Thomas 
Mathias observed that Gothic novels ‘propagated their species with 
unequalled fecundity’ and left their ‘spawn’ in every bookshop, but Mary 
Shelley’s creation has spawned with a Malthusian menace of which 
Mathias could not even have conceived.2  Indeed, we cannot conceive of it. 
Already, for example, it is quite simply impossible for any one individual 
to pursue every reference to ‘Frankenstein’ on the internet in his or her 
lifetime. The forms these metamorphoses have taken, the degree of 
familiarity with the original story they betray, have varied enormously.3  
Still, however, they can all be said to have originated in Mary Shelley’s 
novel of 1818 or its revised edition of 1831.  
 
 In literary criticism and literary history, as it happens, this restless 
metamorphosis has not always been the case. Popularizations and parodies 
have continued unabated since Presumption; or, The Fate of Frankenstein 
took to the London stage in July 1823,4 but until thirty years ago 
Frankenstein drew from literary critics only an occasional, parenthetical 
reference to its well-meaning ineptitude. Frankenstein was cited as ‘an 
interesting example of Romantic myth-making, a work ancilliary to such 
established Promethean masterpieces as Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound 
and Byron’s Manfred’, to quote Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, and 
Mary Shelley herself only acknowledged because of the ‘literary/familial 
relationships’ she represented.5  Gilbert and Gubar may well have had in 
mind Harold Bloom’s influential visionary hierarchy: 
 
what makes Frankenstein an important book, though it is only a 
strong, flawed novel with frequent clumsiness in its narrative and 
characterization, is that it contains one of the most vivid versions we 
have of the Romantic mythology of the self, one that resembles 
Blake’s Book of Urizen, Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound and Byron’s 
Manfred, among other works. Because it lacks the sophistication and 
imaginative complexity of such works, Frankenstein affords a unique 
introduction to the archetypal world of the Romantics.6 
 
By saying badly what the canonical male Romantic poets were saying 
well, Frankenstein was thought to function at once to justify their 
canonization and to illuminate the otherwise difficult, self-reflexive 
enterprise of Romanticism. Where Blake and Shelley and Byron wrote of 
Romanticism from the vexed inside, that is, Mary Shelley offered what 
was at best a simplified version from the outside, at worst ‘a passive 
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reflection of some of the wild fantasies which, as it were, hung in the air 
about her’ (Mario Praz)7. ‘Like almost everything else about her life, 
Frankenstein is an instance of genius observed and admired but not 
shared’, according to Robert Kiely;8 ‘one of those second-rate works’, 
declared D. W. Harding, ‘written under the influence of more 
distinguished minds’.9   
 
 Thanks largely to some Copernican changes in our critical universe, 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein now has a reputation commensurate with the 
looming bulk of its own Monster, having been unofficially canonized by 
the sheer variety and extent of interpretative activity that it has inspired 
over the last thirty years. This article offers a critical map of that activity, 
asking what in its nature and extent it might have to say about 
Frankenstein itself, as well as about the critical conditions under which 
Mary Shelley’s novel has gone forth and multiplied.  
 
 
I 
 
 I have said that Frankenstein has spawned a literally 
incomprehensible number of different interpretations. For all that, 
however, and especially amongst a general public apprized of the myth but 
innocent of the novel, there remains a remarkable consensus — as Marilyn 
Butler points out: ‘Readers, filmgoers, people who are neither, take the 
very word Frankenstein to convey an awful warning: don’t usurp God’s 
prerogative in the Creation-game, or don’t get too clever with 
technology’.10  God’s prerogative; Nature’s prerogative; History’s 
prerogative; the prerogative of the conservative, self-correcting principles 
internal to Evolution — the precise providential scheme is less important 
than its self-licensed priority and the sense of violation offered by 
experiments like Victor Frankenstein’s. This understanding by the general 
public of the Frankenstein myth as a fable of technologico-scientific 
irresponsibility — from the Monster as ‘a simulacrum of industrialized 
reproduction’11 to nuclear physics and biological cloning12 — is one of two 
readings which literary criticism has been content to share, even to take for 
granted. ‘The Monster’, Martin Tropp reminds us, ‘has been called the 
ancestor of “all the shambling horde of modern robots and androids” in 
science-fiction’, while Frankenstein has engendered ‘a whole range of 
demented scientists, from Dr Strangelove to the Saturday morning cartoon 
madmen whose symptoms include unruly hair, a persistent cackle, and the 
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desire to (dare I say it?) “rule the world!” ’: ‘Mad scientist and monster are 
figures in a modern myth; they reflect our fears about the future of man in 
a world of machines’.13 
 
 Since 1980 Frankenstein has been resituated along with all the 
other literature of the Romantic period by New and old forms of 
historicism in a progressively more detailed recreation of the complex and 
interrelated cultures of that period. And this is nowhere more apparent 
than with the culture of the experimental and theoretical sciences of the 
eighteeenth and early nineteenth centuries. The general scientific 
‘background’ to Frankenstein is explored at length in a monograph by 
Samuel Vasbinder and in Anne Mellor’s discussion of the novel as ‘A 
Feminist Critique of Science’: ‘Mary Shelley based Victor Frankenstein’s 
attempt to create a new species from dead organic matter through the use 
of chemistry and electricity on the most advanced scientific research of the 
early nineteenth century. Her vision of the isolated scientist discovering 
the secret of life is no mere fantasy but a plausible prediction of what 
science might accomplish’.14 Moving beyond Mellor’s more abstract 
approach to the history and philosophy of science, however — on the 
conviction that (to quote Marilyn Butler) ‘the academic reading-list needs 
qualifying or replacing with a form of newspaper and journal-talk which 
could be thought of as current language’15 — many recent essays have 
focussed more intensively on Mary Shelley’s and the novel’s relation to 
the immediate discoveries and controversies of the contemporary scientific 
world: 
 
The fluid boundary between death and life — a dominant theme in the 
bio-medical sciences of this time — was of such importance that 
Frankenstein imagined that, in time, he might be able to ‘renew life 
where death had apparently devoted the body to corruption’. The 
belief that the boundary between life and death was reversible was 
widely held at the time, indeed for most of the eighteenth century 
there had been sustained interest in suspended animation, techniques 
for reviving the drowned and the hanged, premature burial — indeed 
in any aspect of medicine that held out the hope that death could be 
delayed, avoided, held at bay. Medical writers imagined doctors in a 
quasi-divine role, shedding new light on nature’s processes.16 
 
Ludmilla Jordanova, from whom I quote, reads into Victor Frankenstein’s 
researches and attitude ‘the fantasies of (at least some) medical 
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practitioners of the time’ — ‘a new breed of metropolitan medical men’ — 
and their struggle to create ‘a culture of medical and scientific power’ as 
‘one way of securing power itself’. To highlight the issue of the social 
pathology of the profession and relate it to the critical preoccupation with 
the ‘birth myth’ in Frankenstein that I discuss below, Jordanova focusses 
her discussion on the controversy of ‘man midwifery’.17  Butler, on the 
other hand, traces more narrowly the flux and reflux of ‘the vitalist debate’ 
over the years of the novel’s intellectual gestation, concentrating on the 
Shelleys’ relationship with one of its more articulate participants, William 
Lawrence, and showing how the very language of this often personal and 
always political debate enters the novel.18 
 
 One thing that becomes increasingly apparent the closer that 
scholarship brings us to Regency Britain, especially to the hybrid ‘science’ 
of medical practice and its day to day, often ad hoc procedures, is that any 
line drawn between the Gothic on the one hand, and the theory and 
practice of the empirical sciences in the early nineteenth century on the 
other, must remain tentative. The title of Tim Marshall’s recent study says 
it all: Murdering to Dissect: Grave-Robbing, Frankenstein, and the 
Anatomy Literature.19  The closer we come to such historical phenomena 
as the 1832 Anatomy Act, in other words, the more history, both as the 
past itself and as a narrative of the past, becomes a Gothic genre. And the 
Gothicization of history — in this case the teaching and practice of 
anatomy and surgery — serves simultaneously to de-Gothicize episodes 
like the following in Frankenstein:   
 
Now I was led to examine the cause and progress of this decay, and 
forced to spend days and nights in vaults and charnel houses. My 
attention was fixed upon every object the most insupportable to the 
delicacy of the human feelings. I saw how the fine form of man was 
degraded and wasted; I beheld the corruption of death succeed to the 
blooming cheek of life; I saw how the worm inherited the wonders of 
the eye and brain. I paused, examining and analysing all the minutiæ 
of causation, as exemplified in the change from life to death, and 
death to life, until from the midst of this darkness a sudden light broke 
in upon me . . . (p. 35) 
 
So it is with the many other, less sensational studies that similarly move to 
demystify the text — in literary terms, to de-Romanticize it — by bringing 
it back into a precisely unsensational relation to the social and political 
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quotidian. The point they make and remake is the point that Mary Shelley 
herself stressed in her 1831 introduction, that invention ‘does not consist 
in creating out of void’; that ‘the materials must, in the first place, be 
afforded’.20  Of the revolutions effected in our understanding of 
Frankenstein over the last thirty years, this move to demystify the story by 
refiguring it within the rich context of those historical materials that were 
afforded may well prove, because of historicism’s own ‘empirical’ 
methodology, the most lasting.  
 
 Though at a cost, it seems to me. Victor Frankenstein may be 
neither archetype nor psychopath and may have shared his arrogance and 
researches with a number of Mary Shelley’s contemporaries — after all, 
the ‘projectors’ in Swift’s Academy of Lagado were carrying out 
experiments that had been performed by members of the Royal Society. 
But Mary Shelley’s Monster, like Swift’s Laputans, steps out of another 
imaginative realm altogether, and this in spite of all the authentic wild, 
unnurtured and untutored ‘noble savages’ that roamed the pages of 
Enlightenment speculation on psychology and education. Jordanova 
protests defensively that she is ‘not claiming for Frankenstein some kind 
of “documentary” status it does not possess’, but in doing so betrays the 
danger of an historical reconstruction so thoroughgoing that the text 
disappears into the material conditions that produced it or the 
reconstruction itself becomes nothing more than a theoretically 
sophisticated search for sources and analogues. It is one thing to attend to 
Frankenstein’s running argument with contemporary reviewers and 
another thing to allow it ‘to speak to the mysterious fears of our nature, 
and awaken thrilling horror’ as Mary Shelley certainly hoped it would (p. 
195). 
 
 
II 
 
 The other interpretation literary critics have been content to share 
with the general public is of Frankenstein as a political fable, a reading 
that became idiomatic soon after publication and one that dominated 
nineteenth-century usage.21  ‘Like her father’, writes biographer William 
St Clair, Mary Shelley ‘provided a metaphor for the upheavals of the age. 
The phrase “to create a Frankenstein monster” was to become a 
nineteenth-century political cliché’.22  In this, the Monster is seen either as 
a composite symbol of the lower classes or, more often, as symbolizing an 
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historically specific, especially unruly section of the lower classes turning 
threateningly on their social superiors. The poet Shelley exonerated the 
revolutionary psychology while revealing the allegorical key to this family 
of readings in a review of Frankenstein that remained unpublished in his 
lifetime: 
 
nor are the crimes and malevolence of the single Being, though indeed 
withering and tremendous, the offspring of any unaccountable 
propensity to evil, but flow irresistably from certain causes fully 
adequate to their production. They are the children, as it were, of 
Necessity and Human Nature. In this the direct moral of the book 
consists, and it is perhaps the most important and of the most 
universal application of any moral that can be enforced by example — 
Treat a person ill, and he will become wicked. Requite affection with 
scorn;  let one being be selected, for whatever cause, as the refuse of 
his kind  — divide him, a social being, from society, and you impose 
upon him the irresistable obligations — malevolence and selfishness23 
 
For Shelley’s and subsequent radical readings, monstrous intimidation 
follows necessarily from equally monstrous and dehumanizing neglect. ‘ 
“Oh, Frankenstein” ’, protests the Monster to his maker, ‘ “be not 
equitable to every other, and trample upon me alone, to whom thy justice, 
and even thy clemency and affection, is most due. Remember, that I am 
your creature: I ought to be thy Adam, but I am rather the fallen angel, 
whom thou drivest from joy for no misdeed” ’ (pp. 77-8).  
 
 In the bulk of historico-political readings, Frankenstein ‘is 
traversed with the images and effects of the French Revolution’.24 Lee 
Sterrenberg, for example, cites intriguing detail like Mary Shelley’s 
choice, in Ingolstadt, of a place that had been identified in the Abbé 
Barruel’s Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism (1797) and by 
Thomas Robison in his Proofs of a  Conspiracy (1798) as the home of a 
secret society called Illuminati and thus as the intellectual cradle of the 
French Revolution.25  Chris Baldick, on the other hand, traces the 
accusation of monstrosity back and forth between anti-Jacobin and Jacobin 
throughout the revolution controversy of the 1790s. Frankenstein is seen 
to participate in the battle for rhetorical supremacy instigated by ‘the 
monster image’ of filial ingratitude ‘organizing, understanding, and at the 
same time preserving the chaotic and confused nature of the revolutionary 
events’ in Edmund Burke’s account in his Reflections on the Revolution in 
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France (1790).26  Finally, Marie Roberts discovers an allegorical 
specificity, not in the historical origins of the novel, but in the political 
theory it proposes: ‘The dialectic between Victor and the monster may be 
understood in terms of Marx’s theory of alienation, part of which concerns 
mankind’s alienation from the product of its labour, seen in the 
estrangement of the monster from his maker. The ceature has the 
characteristics of both worker and product, having been negated and 
alienated by capitalist society’.27 
 
 Whether Frankenstein is interpreted as a Rousseauistic myth of 
innocence corrupted by society or — anachronistically, as in Roberts’s 
case — as a political economic myth of industrial capitalist expansion, 
socio-political readings are often seemlessly combined with readings of 
the novel as an allegory of the dangers of scientific-technological 
production out of control. The historical paradigms here were the 
machine-breaking Luddite uprisings in Nottinghamshire and the North, 
‘and the Pentridge uprising of 1817’, revolts that according to Paul 
O’Flinn pressed directly on the Shelley-Byron circle and are figured in the 
clash between Frankenstein and his Monster. ‘The strength in the text’, for 
O’Flinn, is its sense of ‘the impact of technological developments on 
people’s lives and the possibility of working-class revolution’.28  This may 
be amongst the things Ann Mellor has in mind when she says that Mary 
Shelley ‘initiated a new literary genre, what we now call science fiction’,29 
for the same fear of mechanization out of control informs the typical 
science-fiction dystopia of our own century: a sinister scientific 
technocracy whose success is built upon the marginalization and attempted 
dehumanization of the mass of the people — in 1984, for example, and 
Huxley’s Brave New World through to the more recent cyberspace 
equivalents of William Gibson.  
 
 Like those readings that exhume the front-page scientists and 
medical practioners of the time, political readings come most commonly 
from the historicists. In its determination to restore the text to the culture 
out of which it emerged, historicism reacts against any tendency to read 
the text as a universal myth, a tendency it identifies as (irresponsibly) 
Romantic. Two difficulties with historico-political readings of 
Frankenstein are worth mentioning before we leave them, however — 
besides the one I mentioned earlier of substituting for the text the 
conditions of its production. The first is one of evidence — not a lack, but 
a surfeit of evidence. Moves to read the text back into its specific context 
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can always find ample objects and occasions, given that in any period 
there is more going on than we can ever assimilate and organize 
historically. In the early nineteenth century this was, if anything, only 
more urgently and self-consciously the case.  The fact that the Shelleys 
and the Godwins were argumentatively and actively engaged in 
contemporary political and print culture makes little that was said and 
done during the period irrelevant to a genetics of Frankenstein. Not only is 
criticism obliged to offer evidence, then, but it is obliged to offer it in the 
face of the wealth of potentially relevant material that it has more or less 
consciously excluded from consideration.  
 
 There is an interesting moment in Gilbert’s and Gubar’s The 
Madwoman in the Attic in which a parenthetical attempt is made to 
determine the significance of the choice of ‘William’ for the name of 
Victor Frankenstein’s murdered brother: his ‘name is that of Mary 
Shelley’s father, her half brother, and her son so that one can hardly decide 
to which male relative she may have been alluding’. 30 Gilbert and Gubar 
might have thrown in any number of Mary Shelley’s friends, a handful of 
well known poets, and a huge percentage of the other males in a country 
where ‘William’ was the most popular Christian name. While none of this 
rules out the possibility of an allusion to one or more of the close relatives 
they mention, it surely serves to discipline the impulse to leap at any echo, 
for significance of this kind requires stricter laws of probability than 
Frankenstein is wont to invoke in its critics.  
 
 The second difficulty has to do with ideology — the ideology of 
the author or the novel, that is, for the critic’s is less often in doubt. 
Where, exactly, does Frankenstein stand on the issue scientific 
experimentation? — on the development of the medical profession? — on 
the justice and significance of the French Revolution or the Luddite 
revolts? — and so on. Rephrased as an issue of critical method, however, 
the reservation I am expressing concerns a tendency in socio-political 
readings brilliantly and confidently to recreate the political culture and 
invoke the contentious issues without asking how far the novel endeavours 
to resolve them — and if it does so, how successful it is. Chris Baldick’s 
utterly convincing location of the language of monstrosity within the 
discourse of revolution and reaction, for example, skirts the issue of whose 
side Mary Shelley is on in the debate (he is comparatively uninhibited in 
his characterization of Godwin’s position). So it is with many other 
historical studies whose scholarship and critical relevance is never in 
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question. This reluctance to prosecute the enquiry may have something to 
do with the fact that the novel is more conservative than many of its 
modern academic critics are willing to admit. On the other hand, it may 
exemplify the ‘uncertainty concerning the status of Mary Shelley as a self-
conscious artist’ that Pamela Clemit identifies as ‘a feature of 
Frankenstein criticism down to the present day’.31   
 
 
III 
 
 We will return to the question of the variety and validity of 
interpretations of Frankenstein later. In the meantime, it is worth 
remarking how easily criticism has been able to politicize the Monster’s 
predicament as feminine, in spite of his nominal masculinity. For Gilbert 
and Gubar, for example, ‘the monster’s narrative is a philosophical 
meditation on what it means to be born without a “soul” or history, as well 
as an explanation of what it feels like to be a “filthy mass that move[s] and 
talk[s]”, a thing, an other, a creature of the second sex’32 — that sex which 
is not one, in Luce Irigaray’s terms. It is especially his ‘unique knowledge 
of what it is like to be born free of history’ that is said to ally the Monster 
with those whose pasts have been effaced or repressed: the slave; the 
colonized subject; the ‘nameless’ woman.33  But the book is a woman’s 
and feminism has no room for other oppressions: ‘Though it has been 
disguised, buried, or miniaturized, femaleness — the gender definition of 
mothers and daughters, orphans and beggars, monsters and false creators 
— is at the heart of this apparently masculine book’.34  And certainly the 
critical identification and exposition of the feminine preoccupations of this 
male-dominated text have given rise to some of the best, most various and 
intriguing critical readings of Frankenstein over the last twenty-odd years. 
 
 The mother of its feminist or female readings, Ellen Moers was the 
first to suggest that ‘Frankenstein is a birth myth, and one that was lodged 
in the novelist’s imagination, I am convinced, by the fact that she was 
herself a mother’. The obsession with birth is said to derive in large part 
from Mary Shelley’s traumatic experiences of loss in child birth — first of 
losing her mother, who died so soon after Mary Shelley’s own birth, then 
of losing children of her own — as well as from her more general 
knowledge of the potential dangers in pregnancy and giving birth faced by 
women at the time. But it is especially in Victor Frankenstein’s 
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abandonment of the Monster, writes Moers, ‘where Mary Shelley’s book 
is most interesting, most powerful, and most feminine’: 
 
in the motif of revulsion against newborn life, and the drama of guilt, 
dread, and flight surrounding birth and its consequences. Most of the 
novel, roughly two of its three volumes, can be said to deal with the 
retribution visited upon monster and creator for deficient infant care. 
Frankenstein seems to be distinctly a woman’s mythmaking on the 
subject of birth precisely because its emphasis is not upon what 
precedes birth, not upon birth itself, but upon what follows birth: the 
trauma of afterbirth.35 
 
Again, as in the various political readings which are in truth social 
versions of the same psychodrama, the most articulate in defence of this 
interpretation is the Monster himself: ‘ “Hateful day when I received 
life!”, I exclaimed in agony. “Cursed creator!  Why did you form a 
monster so hideous that even you turned from me in disgust?” ’ (p. 105). 
An often clear eyed and always eloquent interpreter speaking out of the 
narrative centre of the novel, the Monster in fact can be said to have pre-
empted most of the allegorical readings of the novel.  
 
 Few critics follow Moers’s precise emphases and most try to avoid 
the naively direct biographical equations she comes up with on occasion, 
yet the freedom with which she turned to women’s issues proved 
liberating for feminist and non-feminist critical discussion of Frankenstein 
alike. Moers’s ‘birth myth’ and Robert Kiely’s reading of Frankenstein as 
‘a parable in which Victor Frankenstein’s hubris lies not in his usurping 
the creative power of God, but in his attempt to usurp the power of 
women’ became the central themes upon which feminist criticism worked 
its variations,36 and feminism and psychoanalysis established a tacit 
conspiracy that has required the recognition, at the very least, of all 
subsequent criticism. In her reading of ‘Frankenstein’s Circumvention of 
the Maternal’, Margaret Homans evolves the most searching and sustained 
example of this synthesis: 
 
The novel is about the collision between androcentric and gynocentric 
theories of creation, a collision that results in the denigration of 
maternal child bearing through its circumvention by male creation. 
The novel presents Mary Shelley’s response to the expectation, 
manifested in such poems as Alastor and Paradise Lost, that women 
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embody yet not embody male fantasies. At the same time, it expresses 
a woman’s knowledge of the irrefutable independence of the body, 
both her own and those of the children that she produces, from 
projective male fantasy.37  
 
Also tacitly established, it must be admitted, besides the conspiracy of 
feminism and psychoanalysis, was the licence to use Frankenstein to say 
anything that needed to be said.  
 
 Again, as the readings of Moers and Homans make plain, Mary 
Shelley’s own life has only added possibilities to an already suggestive 
text. The best of these readings, however, have been able to use 
biographical detail to reach beyond into the text itself.  Perhaps the one 
that has managed most effectively to turn ‘the elaborate, gothic psycho-
drama of her family’ to its literary critical purposes is that of Sandra 
Gilbert and Susan Gubar. Gilbert and Gubar proceed on the explicit 
assumption that a biographical reading of a novel by a young woman with 
Mary Shelley’s experience and aspirations is also and necessarily a highly, 
if often awkwardly, literary reading. Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin 
Shelley’s mind and novel offer ‘a fictionalized rendition of the meaning of 
Paradise Lost to women’ in which ‘the part of Eve is all the parts’: ‘the 
monster’s uniquely ahistorical birth, his literary anxieties, and the sense 
his readings (like Mary’s) foster that he must have been parented, if at all, 
by books; not only all these traits but also his shuddering sense of 
deformity, his nauseating size, his namelessness, and his orphaned, 
motherless isolation link him with Eve and with Eve’s double, Sin’.38 
 
 How far Frankenstein is promoted as a feminist myth — as well as 
being a myth of miscreation written by a woman, that is — depends not 
just on how it is read but also on what feminism is taken to mean. As a 
powerful if oblique plea for an archetypal division of ‘labour’ focussing on 
Victor Frankenstein’s ‘usurpation of the role of mother’ in bringing to 
birth,39 for example, the story is a deeply conservative one, arguably 
reacting against strategic attempts by early feminists like the author’s 
mother, Mary Wollstonecraft, to play down or circumvent the issue of 
biological difference. Most readers, critical or otherwise, have noticed how 
‘women are conspicuously absent from the main action’, and how passive 
and self-effacing those women that do appear are,40 though Kate Ellis 
rightly notes that ‘the female role as one of constant, self-sacrificing 
devotion to others’ is ironized in the earlier, 1818 text.41  But ‘because it 
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does not speak the language of feminist individualism which we have 
come to hail as the language of high feminism within English literature’, 
to quote Gayatri Spivak, as a text of ‘nascent feminism’ it ‘remains 
cryptic’.42  So for Gilbert and Gubar ‘the tale of the blind rejection of 
women by misogynistic/Miltonic patriarchy’ is the ‘covert plot’ of the 
novel only, and the closest it ever comes to a critique is merely to clarify 
the insuperable prejudices of the Miltonic myth — thus presumably 
serving to expose them to the more alert and motivated criticism of later 
commentators.43   
 
 So it is with the reading of Frankenstein that might reasonably be 
called the orthodox feminist reading, one that with Mary Poovey sees the 
novel as calling into question ‘the egotism that Mary Shelley associates 
with the artist’s monstrous self-assertion’: 
 
As long as domestic relations govern an individual’s affections, his or 
her desire will turn outward as love. But when the individual loses or 
leaves the regulating influence of relationship with others, imaginative 
energy always threatens to turn back upon itself, ‘mark’ all external 
objects as its own and to degenerate into ‘gloomy and narrow 
reflections upon self’.44 
 
This is orthodox in the sense of its picking up one of the oldest motifs of 
Western literary culture in the overreacher, and orthodox also in the sense 
that it casts the feminine in an existentially conservative, even timorous 
role of the kind against which, again, Mary Wollstonecraft fought so 
eloquently in her Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Indeed, insofar as 
(to quote Christopher Small) ‘Frankenstein himself is clearly and to some 
extent must intentionally have been a portrayal of Shelley’ in a novel 
which is a meditation on miscreants,45 then for proponents of this orthodox 
reading like Mary Poovey, Ann Mellor, and Margaret Homans46 the 
feminist critique is a conservative critique. In Shelley, according to Ann 
Mellor, Mary Shelley perceived ‘an intellectual hubris or belief in the 
supreme importance of abstractions that led him to be insensitive to the 
feelings of those who did not share his ideas and his enthusiasms’.47   
 
 There is no unqualified or uncritical intellectual hubris in the work 
of Shelley, as it happens, or in that of any other Romantic poet for that 
matter, which is only to say that Frankenstein might more faithfully be 
seen as taking its place beside Alastor and Julian and Maddalo and The 
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Triumph of Life as ironic or anticlimactic quest. If, as Paul Cantor argues, 
Mary Shelley ‘turned the creation myth back upon Romanticism’ to reveal 
‘the dark underside to all the visionary dreams of remaking man that fired 
the imagination of Romantic myth-makers’, she had that in common with 
other Romantic myth-makers, not least her husband.48   
 
 
IV 
 
 Translated into the language of psychoanalysis, the Romantic 
egotism that Victor Frankenstein shared with Percy Bysshe Shelley 
becomes primal or ‘radical narcissism, a debilitating obsession with the 
self’.49 For Joseph Kestner, narcissism was not only the distinguishing 
feature of the hero’s psychpathology, it was a structural principle in the 
text itself: ‘the mise en abyme, the story within the story’. Discussing the 
episode of Elizabeth’s murder on her and Victor’s wedding night, Kestner 
concludes that 
 
Like Echo in the Greek myth, Elizabeth is destroyed by her Narcissus. 
The whole truth of this episode is that, fearing sexual contact, 
Frankenstein wanted the woman dead, desiring only to love himself, 
latently homosexual. The narcissistic Other (the Creature), by 
strangling Elizabeth, intervenes to prevent the normal separation of 
‘ego-libido’ from ‘object-libido’ discussed by Freud in ‘On 
Narcissism’. Instead, Frankenstein’s libido is a narcissistic auto-
erotism. Just as the face of the Creature had appeared when 
Frankenstein awoke from his dream about Elizabeth and his mother, 
so now does ‘the face of the monster’ grin at him through the inn 
window.50 
 
What is interesting here is that Kestner’s highly technical case history 
should amount substantially to the same reading as Mellor’s and Poovey’s. 
Indeed, most of the psychoanalytic approaches to the novel, and all of 
those that make Victor Frankenstein’s the central and mediating pysche, 
focus on one or more of what in Freud is a network of motifs and 
symptoms, partially invoked here by Kestner: narcissism; the mirror; 
impotence; autoeroticism; (latent) homosexuality; and so on.  
 
 The other common ingredient (again, usually part of the network) is 
the mother — Frankenstein’s or Mary Shelley’s or the Monster’s — the 
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more pressing an issue, as it turns out, in that in each case the mother is 
either dead or non-existent. Writing in answer to her question ‘Is There a 
Woman in This Text?’, Mary Jacobus rounds up the usual suspects: in 
exchanging ‘a woman for a monster,’ Victor Frankenstein prefers an 
imagined over an actual being (Romantic egotism) which is also, as Victor 
says, ‘a being like myself’ (primal narcissism), one that is tellingly created 
right after — and thus in obvious compensation for — the death of the 
egoistically rejected mother.51  So for Margaret Homans, Frankenstein ‘is 
simultaneously about the death and obviation of the mother and about a 
son’s quest for a substitute object of desire’.52  (In his film version of Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein, Kenneth Branagh has Frankenstein bring Elizabeth 
back to life and dance with her a dance he had shared with his mother as a 
child.)  In one way or other, writes Peter Brooks, ‘the radically absent 
body of the mother more and more appears to be the “problem” that 
cannot be solved in the novel’.53    
 
 Two vital pieces of evidence are invariably cited and discussed in 
this connection. One is the miniature portrait of the dead Caroline 
Frankenstein belonging to her son (and Victor’s brother) William and used 
by the Monster to implicate Justine Moritz in William’s murder; the other 
is Victor Frankenstein’s post-natal nightmare, whose powerfully 
suggestive imagery compels critical speculation: 
 
I was disturbed by the wildest dreams. I thought I saw Elizabeth, in 
the bloom of health, walking in the streets of Ingolstadt. Delighted 
and surprised, I embraced her; but as I imprinted the first kiss on her 
lips, they became livid with the hue of death; her features appeared to 
change, and I thought that I held the corpse of my dead mother in my 
arms; a shroud enveloped her form, and I saw the grave-worms 
crawling in the folds of the flannel. I started from my sleep with 
horror; a cold dew covered my forehead, my teeth chattered, and 
every limb became convulsed; when, by the dim and yellow light of 
the moon, as it forced its way though the window-shutters, I beheld 
the wretch — the miserable monster whom I had created. He held up 
the curtain of the bed; and his eyes, if eyes they may be called, were 
fixed on me. (pp. 39-40) 
 
Still on remarkably absent mothers, and like many others noting the 
maternal associations of the ‘nature’ into which Victor Frankenstein pries 
and penetrates, Marc Rubenstein focusses his analysis on Mary Shelley 
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and on her endeavours, as a guilt-ridden daughter feeling responsible for 
the death of her mother, to make restitution in a tale which Rubenstein 
interprets as a self-punitive acting out of her own destruction at the hands 
of her own child.54   
 
 When Mary Shelley is not understood to be in quest for her dead 
mother, with ‘deep fears about an imbalance within herself’, she is seen as 
using the novel to disburden herself of a ‘muted hostility’, first, ‘toward 
her younger half-brother’ — who ‘unlike herself possessed a mother and, 
as a male, had received his father’s identity and approbation’ — and then 
toward the better known William Godwin, her father. The virtue of these 
accounts, like the one by U. C. Knoepflmacher from which I quote, is the 
corrective they offer to readings that concentrate almost exclusively on the 
absent feminine, when males of various complexions dominate the text 
and Victor Frankenstein has the distinction of being not only a bad mother, 
but a bad father as well.55   
 
 Finally, in the interpretative economy of critical psychoanalysis, 
fathers and sons, creators and creatures, have an uncanny habit of standing 
in for each other as discussion of parenthood or origins turns to the mutual 
reflexiveness of the various characters in the text. For Joseph Kestner, for 
example, the three-fold narrative framing highlights the similarities among 
what he calls ‘the three protagonists’ — Walton, Frankenstein, and the 
Monster — similarities ‘which signal their doubleness and otherness, the 
one the doppelgänger of the next, including their desire to explore, their 
failure to love, their loneliness, their avid reading, and their egoism’.56  
How far the origins of the Gothic motif of the shadow or Doppelgänger 
can be said to lie in narcissism, or in psychotic projection, and how far 
psychoanalytic theory is itself a development of the Gothic is a moot 
point, especially when it is Mary Shelley who is under analysis. If the 
presence of the double is ‘symptomatic’, a good many undiagnosed writers 
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries must have shared 
Mary Shelley’s pathology, for as Martin Tropp suggests ‘such tales were 
popular at the time’.57  Still, ‘almost every critic of Frankenstein has noted 
that Victor and his Monster are doubles’ (George Levine).58 Here it is 
Victor Frankenstein rather than the Monster who pre-empts: ‘I considered 
the being whom I had cast among mankind, and endowed with the will and 
power to effect purposes of horror . . . nearly in the light of my own 
vampire, my own spirit let loose from the grave, and forced to destroy all 
that was dear to me’ (p. 57). Paul Cantor, in turn, explicates: ‘The monster 
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becomes Frankenstein’s Doppelgänger, his double or shadow, acting out 
the deepest darkest urges of his soul, his aggressive impulses and working 
to murder one by one everybody close to his creator’.59   
 
 The ‘doubleness and otherness’ Kestner typically sees as marking 
relations between the three main characters, Jerrold E. Hogle concentrates 
in the Monster, whose very hybridity as a composite of pieces sutured 
together in a ‘workshop of filthy creation’ (p. 36) is said to make him 
representative of an ‘otherness’ at once more capacious and more 
disturbing. Deferring to a principle of ab-jection derived from the 
psychoanalytic theory of Julia Kristeva — a self-defensive ‘throwing 
from’ of a ‘dimly recalled and feared multiplicity’ — Hogle reads the 
multiplicitous Monster as a displacement or scapegoat embodying the 
threat of an archetypal ‘otherness’:  
 
The creature is a ‘monster’ in that it/he embodies and distances all 
that a society refuses to name — all the betwixt-and-between, even 
ambisexual, cross-class, and cross-cultural conditions of life that 
Western culture ‘abjects’, as Kristeva would put it — . . . It/he is ‘the 
absolutely Other’ . . . pointing immediately, as we have just seen, to 
intermixed and repressed states of being, the divisibility of the body, 
‘thrown-down’ social groups, class struggles, gender-confusions, 
birth-moments, and death-drives . . . as well as to a cacophony of 
ideological and intertextual differences. All the while, though, he/it 
both re-presents each of these alterities and keeps them at a great 
remove by being quasi-human yet strictly artificial. 
 
‘The absolutely Other’, Frankenstein’s Monster has never been busier than 
he is here, in Hogle’s psychomachia or battle of the soul. Rarely, 
moreover, has he borne so ponderous a symbolic burden, for his condition 
of being ‘all of the betwixt-and-between . . . conditions of life’ is said 
(again, after Julia Kristeva) to indicate ‘the most primordial form of being 
half-“inside” and half-“outside” ’: 
 
the ‘heterogeneous flux’ of being partly held inwards and partly 
pushed outwards by the mother’s body at the moment of birth . . . and 
the state, at the same time, of emerging out of death (pre-natal non-
existence) and starting to live towards death (the end point of all the 
‘want’ that begins at birth . . .). This liminal condition of multiple 
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contradictions, where each supposedly distinct state slides over into 
its ‘other’, is the radical heterogeneity. 60 
 
Like the Monster at its centre, the Frankenstein story can thus be 
characterized as a ‘radical heterogeneity’ that is inclusive enough to 
contain any and every possible meaning.  
 
 From here it is not far to reading the Monster, not as a mythical 
figure, but as a source of myth: an Ur-myth, as it were. Thus the claims 
that the Monster represents certain aspects of the human psyche, for 
example, or certain genders or races or social classes, or certain abstract 
ideas, or even (as with Hogle) a complex of ‘alterities’ — these claims are 
subordinated to the sheer fact of the Monster’s illimitable suggestiveness. 
What follows from this suggestiveness are readings of Frankenstein as an 
allegory of making meaning or symbolizing: of metaphoricity; of 
mythopoesis; of making things like. Monstrously so, it would seem. For 
like the Monster, myth is made and released into culture, to undergo 
certain formative and deformative metamorphoses according to that 
culture’s instinctual, ethical and spiritual needs or anxieties. But not only 
does this Monster/myth mean what it was intended to mean by its author 
or culture, it is also liable to get out of control and to assume an 
independent, even potentially destructive life of its own. For Beth 
Newman, for example, narrative and narrator in Frankenstein are 
‘emphatically separable’, indeed psychologically and ethically disruptive 
of each other: ‘once a narrative has been uttered, it exists as a verbal 
structure with its own integrity, and can, like myth, think itself in the 
minds of men (and women). Being infinitely repeatable in new contexts, it 
has achieved autonomy; it now functions as a text, divested of its 
originating voice’. 
 
 
V 
 
 By extending the status of ‘autonomy’ from the framed tales within 
Frankenstein to the novel as a whole, Newman not only defends the 
independence of the Frankenstein myth, she also rather neatly underwrites 
her own determination to proceed with indifference to anything Mary 
Shelley might have intended and to trace in the text an autonomous 
concern ‘with general tendencies in the nature of narrative itself’.61  
According to Newman, Frankenstein is an essay in and on narrative. We 
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have shifted from Frankenstein as a map or drama of the psyche — 
whether Mary Shelley’s or Victor Frankenstein’s — to Frankenstein as a 
map of its own origins and constitution as a literary or mythic ‘text’.  
There is a whole genre of critical approaches to Frankenstein in which, 
with competitive ingenuity, numerous critics have addressed themselves 
directly to what Gilbert and Gubar call ‘the anxious pun on the word 
author so deeply embedded in Frankenstein’.62  In what for convenience 
we can call ‘post-structuralist’ readings, Frankenstein is revealed to be an 
allegory, not of Faustian ‘epistemophilia’ or revolutionary monstrosity or 
male arrogation of the birth privilege or primal narcissism or ‘otherness’, 
but of the act or scene either of writing or of literary criticism itself. 
Popular culture may want its mad scientist, but academic culture wants its 
écriture.  
 
 So for Fred Botting, ‘the text, like the monster, solicits and resists 
attempts to determine a single line of significance’, frustrating 
 
the desires for authority that are represented in and resisted by the 
text-monster. Identifying the novel’s fixed, singular and final meaning 
by way of historical and biographical archives, [certain] readings 
return to the unifying figure of the author as they attempt to authorize 
their own accounts and arrest the monstrously overdetermined play of 
significance that operates in and between criticism’s ‘pre-texts’. Thus 
they repeat Frankenstein’s project. But the monster, this time 
Frankenstein, again eludes capture even as it sustains the pursuit.63 
 
The monstrous in Frankenstein is at once the source of and the explanation 
for the story’s uninterpretability, an uninterpretability that nonetheless 
invites rather than discourages our vain attempts to interpret. This 
elusiveness prefigures the fate of meaning in post-structuralist theory, as 
the text turns into a Derridaean nightmare of destabilizing différance: 
‘Difference, though constitutive of opposition, also exceeds it. The 
instability produced by monstrous difference offers no resting place for 
meaning and thus undermines the role of the literary critic, whose job it is 
to reveal authoritative meaning’.64  Frankenstein, in short, discourses on 
its own discursive unmeaning.  
 
 In a comparable attempt to characterize the vain pursuit of meaning 
inside and outside the text, Peter Brooks invokes, not Jacques Derrida, but 
Jacques Lacan: 
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 The Monster . . . attempts to state the object of his desire. In 
constructing his narrative appeal, he has contextualised desire, made 
it, or shown it to be, the very principle of narrative, in its metonymical 
forward movement. This movement, in Lacanian terms, corresponds 
to the slippage of the inaccessible signified — the object of 
unconscious desire — under the signifier in the signifying chain. . . . 
 Thus it is that the taint of monsterism, as the product of the 
unarrestable metonymic movement of desire through the narrative 
signifying chain, may ultimately come to rest with the reader of the 
text. . . . Perhaps it would be most accurate to say that we are left with 
a residue of desire for meaning, which we alone can realise. 
 
The cynic might want to argue that to say that the reader’s attention is 
driven by a desire to know that can never be satisfied completely is a 
blinding truism, not only about the act of narrating and reading but also 
about consciousness. And Brooks is aware of and slightly embarrassed by 
this: ‘One could no doubt say something similar about any narrative text’. 
What makes the narrative of Frankenstein special for Brooks, however, is 
that, rather than being simply driven by a narrative whose principles it 
exposes, Frankenstein is about ‘the very principle of narrative’ — as it is 
for Beth Newman, only for Brooks it is narrative ‘in its metonymical 
forward movement’, dramatising ‘the fact and process of its transmission, 
as “framed tales” always do’.65  As an explanation of why it is that 
Frankenstein especially should engender such a proliferation of 
(necessarily inadequate) critical readings, Brooks’s reading is at once self-
affirming and curiously fatalistic: ‘A monster is that which cannot be 
placed in any of the taxonomic schemes devised by the human mind to 
understand and to order nature. It exceeds the very basis of classification, 
language itself: it is an excess of signification, a strange byproduct or 
leftover of the process of making meaning’.66  Because nothing exceeds 
like excess, the number and reach of critical readings of Frankenstein must 
be monstrous or disproportionate to anything signified by the text. As for 
Botting and Musselwhite, Frankenstein must mean beyond its own 
meaning.  
 
 Finally and more playfully, not only has the Monster been read 
post-structurally, so to speak, it has also been read as a prototype or 
prophecy of post-structuralism. According to Barbara Claire Freeman, 
there is a prescience in the anti-Kantian monstrosity of the text that is 
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figured, metonymically, in the creature’s ill-fitting skin: ‘comparable to 
the encasement of the sublime in Kantian theory’. By turning the Kantian 
sublime into the monstrous, Freeman argues, Frankenstein anticipates and 
encourages the explosion of ‘theory’ into the complacent world of 
academic philosophy and literature in the late twentieth century. A 
‘terrorism’ effected ‘by the texts of contemporary French theorists, 
especially Derrida’, theory rages abroad, a Monster of the academy’s own 
making and like to overpower the academy itself. Frankenstein turns out 
after all this time to have been a creative prophecy of the triumph of 
literary theory:   
 
Like Frankenstein’s Monster, theory devours whatever it encounters, 
be it a discourse, text, individual, or institution. The terroristic effect 
of theory, as of monstrosity, resides in its capacity to incorporate and 
swallow up another entity without leakage or cessation of appetite. 
Lately, deconstructive theory in particular has infiltrated and then 
devoured departments of language and literature, becoming the focus 
of attention, breaking down instutional divisions and domains. What 
terrorises those who oppose it — and even those who do not — is its 
totalising power and the rapidity with which it spreads, as if the 
university’s immune system has no defence against it. . . . It is as if 
the future of the so-called Sciences of Man has been, or is in the 
process of being, monsterised by theory.67 
 
Freeman’s invoking the popular genre of the campus horror film as a satire 
on the overreaction in the humanities to the advent of theory, while it 
good-humouredly endorses theory’s deconstructive activities, also 
succeeds in exposing weaknesses in those activities of which she appears 
unconscious. Freeman, for example, unwittingly parodies the utterly 
indiscriminate tendency of theory to discover in any number of historically 
and generically distinct texts precisely the same preoccupation: its own. 
And the mock-horror of the campus Monster turns against the way in 
which the academy insists on writing its own existential anxieties large 
across a culture that, in truth, remains indifferent to and puzzled by them.  
 
 
VI 
 
 I have looked only briefly at Frankenstein as a critique of an 
amoral curiosity in the empirical sciences and as a political allegory, and 
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have managed only a few of the many psychoanalytic and post-
structuralist readings that have been lavished on it.  What I hope to have 
conveyed in spite of these limitations, however, is the ‘dizzying profusion 
of meanings’ that Frankenstein has unleashed,68 a profusion so remarkable 
that, where it does not actually enter into interpretation in ways that we 
have glimpsed, is invariably adverted to before the critic launches into the 
recovery of yet another meaning.  It is a measure of just how extensive and 
various has been the critical attention devoted to the ‘famously 
reinterpretable’ Frankenstein that, in order to summarize my own 
summary of extant criticism, I can turn to the criticism itself and select any 
one of a huge number of such summaries — like Paul Sherwin’s of 
interpretations of the Monster: 
 
If, for the orthodox Freudian, he is a type of the unconscious, for the 
Jungian he is a shadow, for the Lacanian an objet à, for one Romantic 
an ‘spectre’, for another a Blakean ‘emanation’; he has also been or 
can be read as Rousseau’s natural man, a Wordsworthian child of 
nature, the isolated Romantic rebel, the misunderstood revolutionary 
impulse, Mary Shelley’s abandoned baby self, her abandoned babe, an 
aberrant signifier, différence, or as a hypostasis of godless 
presumption, the monstrosity of godless nature, analytical reasoning, 
or alienating labour. Like the Creature’s own mythic version of 
himself, a freakish hybrid of Adam and Satan. 69 
 
To which we can add: Eve, nameless woman, alienated labour, the 
colonized subject, the id, orgone energy, Frankenstein’s dark self or 
double — in short, anything and everything made (artificial), or formless, 
or multiform, or repressed, or oppressed, or just plain monstrous.  
 
 How far such mutually indifferent and sometimes even 
contradictory interpretations of the text should be tolerated and how far 
contested; how far an attempt should be made to integrate and reconcile 
them, is unfortunately itself a matter not just of interpretation — which 
recourse to the text, incidentally, however disciplined and ‘disinterested’, 
is unlikely to settle — but also of theoretical conviction.  For some, like 
Fred Botting, ‘Frankenstein is a product of criticism, not a work of 
literature’.70  We cannot talk of the critical metamorphoses of 
Frankenstein, in other words, because Frankenstein is nothing other than 
its critical metamorphoses. And yet, insofar as the act of interpretation is 
seen by Botting as necessarily and narcissistically refiguring the text to 
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suit its own preoccupations and anxieties, surely it shares an arrogance 
with Victor Frankenstein himself?   
 
 In an ingenious reading by Barbara Johnson, Frankenstein is 
identified as a myth of literary self-fashioning or autobiography. Victor 
Frankenstein’s creating the Monster becomes for Johnson the first of two 
awkward attempts to shape a life according to his own needs and desires, 
an attempt in which the ‘monster can thus be seen as a figure of 
autobiography as such’. The second attempt is the account of his activities 
that Victor Frankenstein gives to Walton, which assimilates events that are 
in themselves figurative to a self-exonerating narrative: ‘Frankenstein can 
be read as the story of autobiography as the attempt to neutralize the 
monstrosity of autobiography’.71 As a sophisticated critical tale within a 
critical tale, adapting psychoanalytic and mythic readings of what happens 
in Frankenstein to generic and narrative theory, Johnson’s discussion is 
exemplary in both senses: at once characteristic and brilliant.  
 
 So brilliant, indeed so persuasive is her reading, in fact, that it is 
easy to overlook the self-professed arbitrariness implicit in the 
constructions ‘can thus be seen as’ and ‘can be read as’. As figures of 
contemporary critical speech, these constructions are familiar enough and 
might be said merely to bear witness to Johnson’s dismissal of any single, 
authoritative reading. But does there not inhere in them an indifference to 
the claims of the text, or a residual doubt as to the validity of such a 
reading? In what circumstances, say, or how faithfully, can Mary Shelley’s 
novel be read in this way? ‘From a certain point of view everything bears 
relationships of analogy, contiguity and similarity to everything else’, 
observes Umberto Eco.72  If Frankenstein means what it ‘can be read as’, 
is there not a risk of the meaningful becoming meaningless?   
 
 More to the point, however, is the question of how we can turn this 
excess of critical attention, not into a reading, but into an understanding of 
the text. One obvious thing about Frankenstein, for example, is that 
however convinced we may be about what the Monster symbolizes, say, or 
about what Victor Frankenstein might represent, we neither expect nor 
find that everything the two say and do conforms with that figuration. 
Gilbert and Gubar pause, searchingly, over this elusiveness:  
 
If Victor Frankenstein can be likened to both Adam and Satan, who or 
what is he really?  Here we are obliged to confront both the moral 
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ambiguity and the symbolic slipperiness which are at the heart of all 
the characterizations in Frankenstein. In fact, it is probably these 
continual and complex reallocations of meaning, among characters 
whose histories echo and re-echo each other, that have been so 
bewildering to critics. Like figures in a dream, all the people in 
Frankenstein have different bodies and somehow, horribly, the same 
face, or worse — the same two faces.73 
 
Nor is it possible to devise an allegorical reading comprehensive and 
supple enough to accommodate the existence and specific actions of the 
many secondary characters — the Swiss cast of, besides the Frankensteins 
and Elizabeth, Clerval and Justine; the Ingolstadt professoriat; the de 
Laceys and the exotic Safie — suggestive as each is as a type at times, and 
often, too, as a name.  
 
 An allegorical reading, in short, can take us only so far and no 
further. Like Caleb Williams, her father’s imaginative meditation on 
‘things as they were’ in the 1790s, Frankenstein is a mixture of expressive 
modes, and the issue of its genre or genres has arguably had 
proportionately less critical attention than it deserves.74  A Gothic novel 
acutely sensitive to social and political issues and doubling as myth and 
moral allegory, Frankenstein is also a novel of ideas or ‘philosophical 
novel’ in an eighteenth-century mode. There are times when its 
participation in contemporary intellectual debate is direct — awkwardly so 
if we think of those long episodes in which the Monster regales Victor 
Frankenstein with his opinions on matters of language, learning, 
deformity, and parental responsibility. Oblivious to context and 
psychology, and only minimally dramatic, the novel is content at such 
times simply to direct the reader to the issues under debate.  
 
 Arguably, then, there is simply too much going on for the novel not 
to divide its critics according to their discrete interests and methods. 
Indeed, we might want to go on from here to ask how far the profusion of 
critical interpretations to which it has given rise testifies to a complex 
suggestiveness, and how far to formal defect and intellectual irresolution. 
For Marie Roberts, for example, ‘Shelleyan aesthetics, Wollstonecraftian 
feminism and Godwinian radicalism’ combine to produce ‘a daughter of 
the Enlightenment as ideologically hybrid and disparate as the very 
creature pieced together by Victor Frankenstein’; an ‘amalgam of 
conflicting elements destined to propagate both the unexpected and the 
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incongruous’.75  In an unguarded moment, even Fred Botting has 
suggested that the novel ends ‘with a confusion of opposites that both 
attract and repel’ and ‘cannot resolve the many narrative subject positions 
that conflict with each other as they contend for sympathy’.76  So Edith 
Birkhead finds that ‘the involved, complex plot of the novel seemed to 
pass beyond Mrs. Shelley’s control’: ‘she seems to be overwhelmed by the 
wealth of her resources’.77   
 
 Beyond Mrs Shelley’s control, note. Birkhead’s analogy between 
the novel and the Monster is as old as the introduction to the 1831 edition. 
‘And now, once again’, wrote Mary Shelley, ‘I bid my hideous progeny go 
forth and prosper’ (p. 197). With almost all critics reflecting on the 
analogy, some have identified the novel’s ‘hideous progeny’ quite 
specifically as the uninhibited explosion of interpretative activity that it 
has unleashed. There is in this identification a salutary irony with which I 
will conclude. Mary Shelley may have bid her hideous progeny go forth; 
Victor Frankenstein, however, did not. While the novel’s first movement 
is indeed driven by issues of reproduction, its second movement is driven 
rather by Victor Frankenstein’s resistance to reproduction: resistance, 
literally, to monstrous progeny (again, the Reverend Thomas Malthus 
hovers). Beyond a dramatic anagnorisis involving Victor’s recognition of 
the Monster as his own creation and his own responsibility, in other 
words, the novel’s climax and close are precipitated by his determination 
that his experiment in giving life (hardly eugenics) should end there and 
then, with the one malformed generation. A dream of immaculate 
conception ‘terminates’ in an abortion and the arguably cruel imposition of 
a law of contraception upon the Monster. Frankenstein’s denying himself 
the power and selfish pleasure of the act of generation is of an altogether 
different moral order from his denying the Monster the comforts of 
companionship and propagation. It is not an easy decision. ‘The monster’s 
uncreating mate is the book’s determining absence’, writes Gillian Beer. 
‘Frankenstein denies to his monster entry into the natural order through 
mating and generation’.78  The result is a trail of dead bodies, as the 
innocent are sacrificed to Victor Frankenstein’s belated but ultimately 
successful attempts to trammel up the consequence.  
 
 What this birth control reflects is an anomaly at the very heart of 
the Frankenstein myth, and thus at the heart of our interpretative 
procedures. For if, in spite of criticism’s persistent recourse to the myth to 
justify its own use of the text itself, there is no sanction in the story for the 
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exponential and indefinite growth of critical and cultural metamorphoses, 
neither is there sanction for any other form of indefinite growth. Both 
popularly, idiomatically — when, for example, the epithet ‘Frankenstein’ 
serves for the Monster — and in the sophisticated post-structuralist 
readings that we sampled in which ‘monstrosity’ is seen as a challenge to 
category and even conceptualization, the Monster is used to suggest 
something out of control: ‘The creature turns against him and runs 
amok’.79  But does he — run amok, that is?  Surely the Monster’s 
campaign of deracination remains very much a family affair. Justine and 
the murdered Clerval, after all, were of the Frankensteins’ ‘domestic 
circle’ (p. 22), and with his adopted family the de Laceys the Monster is 
content to sate his ‘rage of anger’ with arson (p. 113). Certainly compared, 
say, with the monster of modern crime fiction, the serial killer, 
Frankenstein’s Monster’s resentment and revenge, while 
disproportionately violent and manifestly self-gratifying, seem curiously 
discriminating and, under the spell of his rhetoric, almost understandable. 
The reader is torn between sympathy on the one hand and fear and disgust 
on the other.  
 
 That it should remain a family affair is the burden of Victor 
Frankenstein’s pivotal decision to abort the Monster’s female counterpart 
and of his determination, later, to pursue and destroy the Monster himself. 
And though we are not witness to the Monster’s destruction, there is no 
justification for doubting it. At the end of the novel an experiment which 
had threatened to explode for various, unanticipated reasons — as well as 
because of Victor Frankenstein’s arrogance and neglect, of course — 
actually implodes. Instead of seeking in the myth of Frankenstein’s 
Monster a curious sanction for its own indiscriminate proliferation, 
therefore, criticism of Mary Shelley’s novel might ask itself whether 
Victor Frankenstein’s difficult and necessarily unsatisfactory decision to 
abort might not have a sad wisdom to offer.  
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